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Safety first: MPs in safe seats are more likely to become 
ministers in the UK 
Elad Klein and Resul Umit 
 
Members of parliament (MPs) have multiple goals but limited resources. Where MPs make up the vast 
majority of ministerial positions as in the United Kingdom (UK), they have to confront the trade-off between 
their goals of vote-seeking (i.e. staying as an MP) and office-seeking (i.e. working as a minister). PADEMIA 
members Elad Klein and Resul Umit examine the relationship between the size of MPs’ majority and 
likelihood that they will hold ministerial office, finding a strong correlation. This suggests that there is a 
hierarchy between the legislative goals and hence that voters can affect the allocation of ministerial positions 
in the UK. 
 
Voters elect their members of parliament 
(MPs) in general elections, but a large majority 
of MPs have very little to do with the day-to-
day governing of the country. It is rather the 
ministers in government, as selected by the 
victorious party leaders, who do. Hence there 
is an obvious link between the general 
elections and government formation with 
regard to who selects ministers. In a recent 
study, we show that there is another – albeit 
a less obvious – connection in terms of who 
gets selected as ministers; MPs in electorally 
safe seats are more likely to become 
ministers. 
This is based on an analysis whether the 
constituency results from the elections to the 
House of Commons over the period 1992-
2015 influenced the likelihood of MPs being 
selected as ministers in the United Kingdom 
(UK). The House of Commons provides the 
perfect case to assess the electoral 
connection of ministerial selection due to the 
single-member districts, large government 
size, and the relatively decentralised candidate 
selection process in the UK. 
Electoral safety affects the ministerial 
selection because elections are a constraint 
over the preferences of MPs and their parties. 
MPs need to stay in the parliament by being 
re-elected to be able to pursue other goals, 
including attaining promotion to government 
ranks. On the other hand, party leaders need 
to maximise the number of their MPs in order 
to stay in the government to achieve their 
policy ideals. 
Electoral constraints differ with the 
marginality of seats for each MP in 
Westminster systems. In single-member 
districts, it is comparatively clear to members 
and to their leaders how electorally safe their 
parliamentary seats are. As the electoral 
marginality of a seat increases, or in other 
words as the number of votes separating 
success from failure to secure a seat 
decreases, re-election becomes the dominant 
motivation. 
Our results show that there is indeed a 
positive relationship between MPs electoral 
safety and their probability of securing a 
ministerial office. Figure 1 below plots the 
predicted probabilities of government post 
allocation across the different degrees of 
 
Electoral safety of MPs affects their 
chance of being selected as ministers in 
the UK 
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electoral safety, where dotted lines indicate 
the 95% confidence interval around the fitted 
line. For an MP with 5% electoral safety, which 
is often considered as marginal, the probability 
of becoming a minister is one in 10. In 
contrast, a 35% majority more than doubles 
this probability for MPs. 
 
Figure 1. Electoral safety increases the probability of being selected as ministers 
 
There are at least two important implications 
of this result. First, if electoral safety increases 
MPs’ chances of becoming ministers, voters 
can affect not only who selects the ministers 
but also who get selected as ministers. 
Second, if MPs and party leaders prioritise 
electoral safety before ministerial office, the 
results also mean that there is an empirical 
evidence for the hierarchy of legislative goals 
– an important theoretical assumption in 
rational approaches to legislative behaviour. 
Electoral safety is particularly important for 
junior MPs to become ministers. Once they 
spend long enough in parliament, which 
roughly 20 years according to Figure 2, 
electoral safety does not significantly affect 
their chances of entering the government 
anymore. Senior MPs enjoy the reputation 
that they have built in time among their 
constituents, and those who have done so can 
then spend more resources on other goals, 
such as attaining a ministerial office, and less 
on the goal of re-election. Think about for 
example a senior MP with 30 years’ 
experience in the parliament. She is less likely 
to be alarmed about a 5% electoral majority 
than a newly elected MP. The former is less 
likely to feel unsafe with the same amount of a 
cushion of votes, and therefore more likely to 
go for a ministerial position with all the 
experience that comes with seniority. 
Do MPs get rewarded for exceptional 
electoral performance such as achieving a 
vote share above their party average? That 
also depends on electoral safety. Our findings 
suggest that party leaders are more likely to 
reward successful MPs and offer them a 
ministerial post when they hold a safe seat. 
This indicates the way parties prioritise re-
election goals; they will be reluctant to 
reward successful MPs if this reward 
jeopardises their re-election. 
 
Voters can affect not only who selects the 
ministers but also who get selected as one 
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Figure 2. The effect of electoral safety disappears after 20 years in parliament 
 
A risk of linking election results to ministerial 
selection is that the causality might run in 
either direction, depending on the candidate 
selection processes in political parties. If party 
leaders in the UK “parachuted” their would-
be ministers to safe seats before general 
elections, it would not be meaningful to talk 
about any effect of electoral safety on 
ministerial selection. However, the effect of 
electoral safety continues to hold among 
those MPs who lost an election before 
entering the parliament. It is reasonable to 
assume that such MPs, who had unsuccessful 
attempts at being elected, were not centrally 
posted to these constituencies become 
ministers later on.   
One of the other controls in the study relates 
to gender. On the one hand, as evident in the 
increasing but still unfair share of female MPs 
in the House of Commons, female citizens are 
less likely to become parliamentary 
representatives. Those females who make it 
to the parliament, on the other hand, are 
more likely to become ministers according to 
the results. This confirms the commitment of 
political parties in the UK to increase 
women’s representation in government. 
Altogether, these findings highlight the 
meaningful weight of the re-election ambition 
both for parties and for parliamentarians, and 
show that safety comes first. Most obviously, 
parties pursue ambitions other than re-
election, which they trade-off. This paper 
demonstrates, however, that electoral safety 
constrains that trade-off. When the prospect 
of re-election is in danger, vote ambition 
outweighs other ambitions. Only when re-
election is secured are other ambitions more 
likely to be taken into account. As a result, 
elections might be more than the dual 
mechanism of choosing a legislative 
representative and a party leader in 
parliamentary systems. Besides, electorates 
can affect the allocation of ministerial 
positions as well. 
 
 
Females might be less likely to be elected 
as MPs. But those who can make it to the 
parliament are more likely to become 
ministers 
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